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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 This report provides an analysis and evaluation of maintenance cultures in United 
Nations Police Contributing Countries (PCC) receiving funding for Formed Police Units from 
the United States.  The US Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs (INL) recognized a marked lack of research on maintenance cultures in 
police agencies receiving foreign funding and sought to build a base of knowledge to aid in 
creating and sustaining maintenance cultures within these organizations.  The INL also requested 
analysis and evaluation of maintenance cultures in five specific African PCCs (Cameroon, 
Ghana, Rwanda, Senegal, and Togo), as well as recommendations to create and sustain 
maintenance cultures specific to these countries.  By establishing effective maintenance cultures, 
INL seeks to ensure that equipment purchased with funding from the United States will operate 
effectively throughout the manufacturer's estimated life-span. 
  
Methods of research and analysis were based on information available from various open 
source online resources and those of the Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis 
Library database.  The findings of this research include possible problems related to the UN 
Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) wet/dry lease system leading to poor maintenance 
practices and the recognition that establishing maintenance cultures where they are lacking, or 
non-existent, is a challenging endeavor.  General recommendations discussed include: 
 
●  Standardization of COE 
● Increase the quality of COE inspections and enforce compliance with wet lease 
maintenance agreements 
● Provide pre-deployment training on proper maintenance practices 
● Conduct FPU performance analysis with metrics specific to maintenance activities 
● Incentivize maintenance culture integration 
● Develop partnerships with organizations outside of the UN to provide maintenance 
training programs 
● Encourage further research into maintenance cultures in PCCs through partnerships with 
educational institutions and think tanks located closer to the PCC.  Consider the provision 
of grants to encourage this research. 
 
 The authors recognize the limitations faced when researching these topics.  Research into 
the problem of maintenance culture in the specified African countries was hindered significantly 
by a lack of available material on the subject.  The research was also limited to online research 
and available databases with no ability to directly observe and research maintenance cultures in 
those countries.  Nor was there any ability to interview pertinent personnel to evaluate and 
establish the current maintenance culture.   
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PART I. SITUATION 
 
Hypothesis 
 
A common set of factors can be located which, if properly applied in a timely fashion, will result 
in the creation and sustainment of an effective maintenance culture. Without a maintenance 
culture, Formed Police Unit (FPU) operational readiness will rapidly diminish and lead to 
mission failure. 
 
Introduction 
 
The United States is a strong supporter of peacekeeping efforts in Africa, contributing nearly one 
billion dollars since 2009 to developing African peacekeeping capacity, strengthening African 
institutions, and providing training and equipment to African troops and police engaged in 
United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) peacekeeping operations.
1
  The US Department of 
State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) assisted countries 
through the International Police Peacekeeping Support Program (IPPOS) in strengthening UN 
police divisions, building capacity for police contributing countries (PCCs), enhancing rapid 
response capabilities, deploying expert advisors, and providing bilateral assistance to countries, 
including training, equipment, and infrastructure improvement projects.
2
 IPPOS engages in 
capacity-building efforts to other PCCs, including FPUs and Individual Police Officers (IPOs) 
from Cameroon, Ghana, Rwanda, Senegal, and Togo. Much like IPPOS, the African 
Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership (APRRP), beginning in 2015, seeks to build key 
military and peacekeeping components in partner countries: Ethiopia, Ghana, Rwanda, Senegal, 
Tanzania, and Uganda.
3
  Focusing on developing high-demand enabling capabilities—including 
airlift, C3IS (command, control, communications, and information systems), engineering, 
logistics, medical capabilities, and FPUs—addressing historical pitfalls of rapid response and 
peacekeeping efforts in hostile regions. Both IPPOS and APRRP focus on sustainable support for 
FPUs, ensuring effective deployment to UN peacekeeping missions around the world, even 
beyond provision of U.S. government assistance.  
In a multi-faceted effort to support FPUs—here defined as cohesive mobile units providing 
support to UN operations—deployed in peacekeeping operations, the International Narcotics and 
Law Enforcement Affairs, Office of Criminal Justice Assistance and Partnership (INL/CAP) 
seeks to augment the impact of foreign assistance funds received by FPU units and PCCs by 
keeping provided equipment functioning long after the provision of funding. While PCCs 
commit to maintaining forces and equipment in exchange for INL capacity-building funds, the 
complex and dangerous conditions are often not conducive to fulfilling this commitment. 
                                                 
1
 The White House: Office of the Press Secretary. (2014). Fact Sheet: U.S. Support for Peacekeeping in Africa. 
Retrieved from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/06/fact-sheet-us-support-
peacekeeping-africa. 
2
 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. (2017). International 
Police Peacekeeping Operations Support Program. Retrieved from https://2009-
2017.state.gov/documents/organization/248126.pdf. 
3
 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. (2017). U.S. Peacekeeping Capacity Building 
Assistance. Retrieved from https://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/2017/266854.htm. 
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Appointed by INL/CAP, Project 32 seeks to produce recommendations germane to establishing 
and maintaining a maintenance culture among UN peacekeeping missions, with respect IPPOS 
and APRRP who provide foundational support to FPUs. Per Project 32, a maintenance culture is 
defined in the following way:  
A maintenance culture in an institution can be defined as the set of sustainable 
practices that enable the combination of technical, administrative, and managerial 
actions during the life cycle of a procured item—intended for retention or 
restoration to a state in which it can perform the required function (Project 32).  
Even more, the pursuit of maintenance culture also involves the identification and cataloging of 
equipment, with varying life cycles and maintenance requirements that are utilized in deployed 
FPU support. Given the dearth of research surrounding maintenance culture development in 
security sector police agencies that receive foreign assistance, this project seeks to address gaps 
in the literature, while analyzing five PCCs—Rwanda, Senegal, Cameroon, Ghana, and Togo—
and deriving concrete recommendations to address producing and sustaining a maintenance 
culture. The FPUs in each PCC serve as case studies from which to draw conclusions and 
formulate recommended actions, considering the challenging conditions FPUs experience within 
deployed countries. 
Identification of Police Contributing Countries 
As the UN focuses on conflicts potentially requiring a Peacekeeping Operation (PKO), a 
Strategic Assessment is convened that includes consultations with Member States to begin 
identifying possible PCCs and a host government. Potential PCCs and a host government are 
identified once the UN’s Tactical Assessment Mission (TAM) reports recommendations on the 
PKO’s size and resources. As the UN has no standing police force, consultations with potential 
PCCs and a host government must be further refined based on the personnel, equipment, and 
facilities these Member States are able and willing to pledge. This, in conjunction with 
increasingly complex mission mandates and coordination, often requires the assembly of a 
multinational force and leadership hierarchy to prepare, deploy, and conduct the PKO. A 
complex conglomeration of international actors and elements seeking to combine different 
decision-making processes, systems, procedures, command authorities, and budgetary pressures 
underscores the different and sometimes nonexistent nature of a unified maintenance culture 
among participants. The UN (2008) has expertly identified issues with not establishing basic 
institutional procedures – of which, equipment maintenance is arguably part of – in its 
Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines publication: 
Effective leadership and strong managerial skills are at a premium during start-up. 
If basic systems and procedures are not established early on, this can cause 
compounding confusion as the mission rapidly expands during start-up. If 
effective and streamlined institutional processes to control the fragmentation of a 
large and diverse mission are not installed during the startup period—such as 
establishing mission decision-making forums, information sharing and 
5 
 
information management protocols, reporting lines, etc.—they will become 
increasingly difficult to introduce later.
4
 (italics ours) 
The inherently serious and critical nature of global PKOs requires massive and unique effort to 
rapidly integrate distinct organizations with different cultures and languages.  An effort to 
understand the maintenance cultures in PCCs is an intuitive step towards identifying methods to 
create and sustain positive maintenance cultures within these critical PKOs.  
Contingent Owned Equipment  
Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) is the equipment owned and brought by PCCs to 
peacekeeping missions, in which the UN reimburses PCCs for their contributions of COE and for 
self-sustainment services provided. The COE system was adopted by the UN in 1996 to simplify 
how countries are reimbursed for providing equipment, personnel, and self-sustainment support 
services to FPUs in peacekeeping missions. To specify the exact amount and type of equipment, 
personnel, and self-sustainment services the PCC is expected to provide, the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the PCC utilize a signed contract, or Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU), completed prior to deployment. By relying on a prior agreement between 
the UN and the PCC for the leasing of equipment and provision of services to personnel, the 
MOU eliminates the need for detailed surveys of equipment and places the responsibility of asset 
management on the PCC (UN General Assembly 2015). The UN is responsible for ensuring that 
PKOs have the personnel and equipment required to fulfill its mission that PCCs provide 
personnel, equipment, and services as specified in the MOU, and that PCCs perform to 
established standards. UN staff is responsible for COE inspections—including an arrival 
inspection, operational readiness inspection carried out every six months, and a final repatriation 
assessment—to verify that COE meets standards for reimbursement. COE inspectors also 
establish and maintain inventories of equipment and identify major equipment and self-
sustainment shortfalls or inefficiencies. These verification and control procedures aim to ensure 
that MOU terms are met by both the UN and PCC during the agreement period. With respect to 
major equipment, two lease models are specified:  
● A wet lease is a COE reimbursement system where the PCC assumes responsibility for 
maintaining and supporting major and minor items of equipment deployed. The PCC is 
then entitled to a reimbursement for providing this maintenance support.  
● A dry lease is a COE reimbursement system where the PCC provides the equipment 
and the UN assumes the responsibility of maintaining the equipment, either directly or 
through contracting with a third party to be reimbursed the maintenance portion of the 
dry lease.  
 
Rates of reimbursement are generic, based on “fair market value” as determined by working 
groups of the General Assembly. A separate MOU is written for each formed military or police 
unit to be deployed to a peacekeeping mission. Currently, there are over 300 MOUs covering 
units deployed to 11 peacekeeping missions, representing over 2 billion US dollars in personnel, 
equipment, and self-sustainment costs annually. Major equipment necessary, as noted by the UN 
                                                 
4
 United Nations. (2008). United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines. United Nations, 
Department of peacekeeping operations. 
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Table 1. FPU Major Equipment (UN 2016) 
(2016), for FPUs are noted in Table 1 (below). In addition to equipment and personnel 
contributions, FPU members are to be supplied with individual kits that include uniform 
components, personal equipment, police equipment, and personal safety and security items.
5
 
Finally, self-sustainment support services eligible for reimbursement include: medical and dental 
services; accommodations, including bedding, furniture, internet access, and general welfare; 
nuclear, biological, and chemical protection (NBC); basic firefighting equipment; 
communication systems; explosive ordinance disposal of unexploded ammunition; and 
observation.
5 
 
 
 
PART II. DISCUSSION 
As noted in the Project 32 description, a dearth of research exploring maintenance culture 
development among security sector agencies presents challenges in properly identifying and 
evaluating a PCC’s maintenance culture. Considering the limited technological connectivity in 
many developing countries, locating accurate and recent data also impacts the ability to craft 
analyses. As such, this report recommends further research into the maintenance culture of 
PCCs, as well as UN procedures regarding inspections, pre-deployment training, and 
reimbursement. The ideal environment to conduct this research would be a full cycle of a PCC’s 
pre-deployment, deployment, and reintegration process, and their interactions with UN oversight 
elements. Additionally, the formation of partnerships with educational institutions, think tanks, 
and research organizations with closer proximity may yield more robust findings. An investment 
in the form of grants to encourage research into this issue will likely pay dividends when 
solutions to poor maintenance cultures can be tailored to the agency in question. 
 
FPUs face numerous challenges as it relates to rapid deployment, operational readiness, and 
operational performance. General challenges, as noted by the UN, include non-submission of 
monthly operational performance reports, limited oversight on FPU coordination, 
professionalism of the FPU coordination office, tendency to use FPUs to replace the host 
country’s military capabilities, improper support given to FPU personnel, and non-compliance 
                                                 
5
 United Nations, General Assembly. (2015). Manual on policies and procedures concerning the reimbursement and 
control of contingent-owned equipment of troop/police contributors participating in peacekeeping missions (COE 
Manual).  
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with FPU policy (UN, 2016, 81).
6
 While participating in peacekeeping operations could be 
financially rewarding, delays in reimbursements for troop and equipment costs are an obstacle 
that affects the capacity or the motivation to participate. Specific to rapid deployment, PCC delay 
procuring COE or seeking donors until after their pledge is accepted and confirmed by DPKO, 
hinders the ability to deploy as needed. Some PCCs (e.g. Rwanda, Senegal, and Cameroon) have 
experienced reimbursement delays in past PKOs, perhaps motivating the delay in procuring 
COE. For example, during its role in AMIS (2004-07), Rwanda also experienced delays in 
receiving compensation from the AU for peacekeepers killed during deployment. Rwandan 
representatives at the UN have cited slow rates of reimbursement as a factor hindering sustained 
commitment. This argument has been regularly raised by members of the Non-Aligned 
Movement, also including Senegal that “urged respect for the timely payment of troop 
contributors,” during the General debate of the 2015 C-34 Substantive session.  
With respect to operational performance of FPUs, deficiencies in COE—for which PCCs are 
responsible under wet leases—limit the performance of FPUs. It is possible that PCCs with 
limited or non-existent capacity to maintain equipment may opt for a wet lease to receive a 
higher reimbursement from the UN—irrespective of their ability to maintain COE. Even more, 
there is little standardization of FPU equipment, leading to inappropriate capacity to achieve 
PKO objectives. FPUs also find challenges in providing and maintaining self-sustaining services, 
damaging FPU capacity and longevity. Finally, there is limited consistency with pre-deployment 
training. While the UN provides training standards for FPUs, it is the responsibility of PCCs to 
provide this training. Developing a maintenance culture is essential to increase the awareness 
about maintenance activity; regarding this, maintenance culture should be studied through 
examining and identifying the determinant factors which influence the development of 
maintenance culture. The ten determinant factors of maintenance culture are leadership; 
communication; motivation, reward systems and recognition; empowerment; involvement; 
policy system, strategy and work planning; teamwork; training and education, organizational 
culture.
7
 Additionally, the recognition that establishing a maintenance culture may be 
challenging and first engaging in the most basic components of maintenance will assist in ease of 
implementation. As such, Oedewald & Reiman (2002) identify the core tasks of maintenance as 
anticipating, reacting, and reflecting, illustrated in Figure 1 (below).
8
  
While PCCs can engage in activities to establish and strengthen maintenance culture, additional 
recommendations can be aimed at the DPKO to incentivize its development: 
● Standardize the types of COE being utilized by FPUs in PKOs, allowing for less 
variability in the quality of COE.  This will also aid in standardizing metrics to monitor 
                                                 
6
 United Nations. (2015). Introduction to UNPOL – FPUs: Command Staff Training. Retrieved from 
http://repository.un.org/bitstream/id/4661883/Introduction%20to%20FPUs.pdf 
 
7
 Sani, S., Mohammed, A., & Misnan, M. (2014). Analysis of the Determinant Factors Development of Maintenance 
Culture in Malaysian Local Authorities. Retrieved from MATEC Web of Conferences: https://www.matec-
conferences.org/articles/matecconf/pdf/2014/06/matecconf_bsfmec2014_01005.pdf 
 
8
 Oedewald, P., & Reiman, T. (2002). Maintenance core task and maintenance culture. In Human Factors and 
Power Plants, 2002. Proceedings of the 2002 IEEE 7th Conference on (pp. 8-8). IEEE. 
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Figure 1: Core Tasks of Maintenance  
(Oedewald & Reiman 2002) 
COE maintenance and appropriately adjust reimbursement, rotation of equipment, and 
PCC accountability of lease requirements. 
● Engage in more thorough quarterly inspections to ensure that equipment is up to DPKO 
standards and to identify maintenance needs as early as possible. 
● Rotate equipment more frequently. 
● Require PCCs that wish to engage in a wet lease agreement to provide a maintenance 
schedule and detailed plans to ensure that PCCs provide the proper maintenance to COE. 
● Standardize pre-deployment training for FPUs instead of suggested guidelines from the 
UN and facilitation by the PCC. This is a critical point in which the UN has direct 
oversight of deploying FPUs and has the ability to inspect their maintenance plan(s), and 
hold them accountable for non-compliance of basic maintenance procedures and 
equipment according to the stipulated type of lease (i.e. dry vs. wet). 
● Conduct FPU performance analysis, including metrics related to equipment and self-
sustainment activities, to reward positive maintenance culture and identify shortfalls in 
PCCs with weak or nonexistent maintenance cultures. 
● The US should develop maintenance policies and procedures to incentivize recipients of 
US aid to integrate maintenance culture.  This should include identifiable milestones and 
standardized and published procedures indicative of positive maintenance cultures.  This 
can also include training programs aimed at educating and certifying PCCs maintenance 
managers as a precondition to support. 
● Develop support organizations outside of the UN to provide maintenance-training 
programs (i.e., the partnership between USAID, the St. Boniface Haiti Foundation, the 
W.K. Kellogg Foundation, and the General Electric Foundation). 
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Source:  Beswick & Jowell 2014 
PART III. CASE STUDIES 
Rwanda 
Situation  
In the last ten years, Rwanda has become an important contributor to UN peacekeeping and AU 
peace operations. Rwandan contributions to peacekeeping were initially precluded by the 1990-
94 civil war, 1994 genocide, and challenges of post-war security, including fighting an 
insurgency in the northwest of the country until 1998 and recurring interventions in the 
neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Since 2004, Rwanda has risen to become 
one of the top providers of peacekeepers for both UN and AU missions, driven by moral 
authority and national pride.
9
  The Rwandan Defense Forces (RDF) are particularly valued due 
to their training, discipline, the development ethos they bring to deployments, in addition to the 
growing number of women among those trained and deployed. The RDF provided the first 
contingent of female police officers to UNOCI in 2012 and currently has the highest number of 
female police on UN missions.   
Rwanda deployed its first 150 peacekeepers to protect ceasefire monitors under the AU Mission 
in Sudan (AMIS) in 2004, framed as an effort to prevent genocide and linking peacekeeping 
directly to the stated 
aims and basis of 
legitimacy of 
Rwanda’s ruling 
party, the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front (RPF). 
Since then, a desire to 
maintain positive 
relationships with key 
donors, support for 
the “responsibility to 
protect” principle, 
commitment to African solutions, and incentives related to prestige and finance have 
underpinned Rwanda’s provision of peacekeepers. In December 2013, Rwanda signed an MOU 
with the AU to send troops to the Central African Republic. It has since deployed 850 soldiers 
under the International Support Mission in Central African Republic (MISCA). Darfur accounts 
for the majority of Rwanda’s overall deployment of troops, with Darfur, Haiti and Mali making 
up most of Rwanda’s police contributions.  
Current Actions 
Although smaller than some of its neighbors, the RDF retains significant capabilities in terms of 
infantry, counter insurgency operations, intelligence, and Special Forces, but also military 
administration. Several officers have been Senior Mission Leaders in peacekeeping operations 
                                                 
9
 Beskwick, D. & Jowell, M. (2014). Peacekeeping contributor profile: Rwanda. Providing for Peacekeeping. 
Retrieved from http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/2015/03/30/peacekeeping-contributor-profile-rwanda/ 
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and many more have been trained for senior positions. Other areas of capability are logistics, 
procurement, and supply. Rwanda’s defense spending remained relatively constant in recent 
years, at around $73 million USD per year between 2010 and 2013.
10
  Due largely to economic 
growth in Rwanda, defense expenditure has declined as a proportion of GDP from 1.34% in 
2010 to 1.06% in 2013. As a result, the RDF continues to require significant financial 
commitment in peacekeeping contributions help to offset declining defense expenditures. 
Reimbursements from the UN for peacekeeping contributions provide significant proportions of 
Rwanda’s defense budget, with approximately 70% of defense expenditures covered from 
reimbursements.
11
  Rwanda is clearly a preferred partner of the US in building African 
peacekeeping capacity. International partners, especially the US, UK, EU, and Japan have 
strengthened the development of the RDF into a valued peacekeeping contributor, through 
military assistance, constructing training facilities, paying for various training courses, and 
procuring non-lethal equipment and providing strategic lift. 
Rwanda experiences shortcoming that include the lack of strategic lift and serious air 
capabilities, such as a lack of a fixed wing aircraft, as well as an opaque and closed decision-
making structure among a few select individuals.
9 
 Even more, delays in reimbursement have 
caused frustration and impacted Rwanda’s performance against wider fiscal targets. During its 
role in AMIS (2004-07), Rwanda also experienced delays in receiving compensation from the 
AU for peacekeepers killed during deployment. Rwandan representatives at the UN have cited 
slow rates of reimbursement as a factor hindering sustained commitment. If Rwanda is to 
maintain large armed forces it will be difficult to make up such a shortfall other than through 
peacekeeping. 
Recommended Results and Changes 
● Continued investment in infrastructure and technology development. 
● Additional training to peacekeepers on proper use of equipment and maintenance. 
● Leverage Rwanda’s pride and enthusiasm for peacekeeping deployments through 
opportunities for leadership. 
● Additional construction of training facilities and courses for peacekeepers.  
● Collaborate with the UN and the DPKO to ensure timely reimbursements of 
contributions. 
● Create a “Superior Maintenance Award/Title” to leverage Rwanda’s national desire to 
maintain positive relationships with key donors. 
● Due to Rwanda’s national pride in their current status as a significant contributor of 
personnel and capabilities, additional UN PKO leadership positions should be offered as 
an incentive to establish positive maintenance culture techniques, and in-turn train other 
PCCs on positive maintenance culture techniques. 
● As a recipient of US aid and capacity development, continued support should be 
predicated on a “Maintenance Culture Development Plan” with periodic accountability 
reviews to ensure implementation. 
                                                 
10
 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). (2015). The Military Balance 2015. London: IISS/Routledge. 
11
 Wilén, N. (2012). A Hybrid Peace through Locally Owned and Externally Financed SSR-DDR in Rwanda?. Third 
World Quarterly, 33:7. 1,323-36. 
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Source: Diallo 2016 
● Establish organizational maintenance schedules on a weekly basis with a focus on 
preventive maintenance and individual accountability. 
● Develop a Mobile Training Team (MTT) to teach proper equipment maintenance 
techniques and tracking systems to Rwandan FPUs. 
● Explore the possibility of USAID programs to incentivize maintenance culture 
development. 
Senegal 
Situation.Senegal has long-standing experience in participating in peacekeeping operations led 
by the UN, the AU, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)—
demonstrating a 
commitment to 
international peace and 
security. The Senegalese 
army first participated in a 
peacekeeping operation as 
part of the Federation of 
Mali, in 1960, the same 
year the country gained 
independence from France. 
Senegal also deployed 600 
men in the UN Operation 
in the Congo (ONUC). 
Since then, Senegal 
deployed personnel in 25 
UN-led peacekeeping operations in Africa (Congo, Angola, Rwanda, Uganda, Central African 
Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, Chad, Sudan and South 
Sudan), Americas (Haiti), Asia and the Pacific (Cambodia and Timor-Leste), Europe (Ex-
Yugoslavia) and in the Middle-East (Egypt, Lebanon, Iran/Iraq, Iraq/Kuwait). The numerous 
peacekeeping operations deployed in Africa in the 21st century, the lack of capacity of many 
African countries to conduct peacekeeping, and Senegal’s new political leadership have been 
key factors in increasing its participation in international peacekeeping.
12
  Its most recent 
deployments have focused on MINUSCA (CAR), MINUSMA (Mali), MONUSCO (DRC), and 
UNAMID (Darfur). Senegal is also a major provider of peacekeepers to non-UN missions, 
especially due to its membership of the AU and ECOWAS. It deployed contingents of 600 troops 
in the first Organization of African Unity (OAU)-led operations in Zaire (1978-79) as part of the 
Inter-African Force during Shaba II; 600 troops in Chad, in the first OAU peacekeeping 
operation (1981-82); and 15 observers in Rwanda (in the Group of Neutral Military Observers 
deployed between 1992-93). Under an AU flag, Senegal deployed a battalion of troops in AMIS 
(Darfur). As a member of ECOWAS, Senegal has played an important role in ECOMOG 
deployments in Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, and Sierra Leone. In 2013, Senegal 
sent 500 troops in the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA).  
                                                 
12
 Diallo, A. M. (2016). Peacekeeping contributor profile: Senegal. Providing for Peacekeeping. Retrieved from 
http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/2015/03/30/peacekeeping-contributor-profile-senegal/ 
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Senegal gained an elected seat on the UN Security Council three times (1968-69, 1988-89, 2016-
17) and its participation in the maintenance of international peace and security through its 
peacekeepers has been a key argument put forward in its campaigns. Even more, Senegal 
participated in the 2015 Leaders’ Summit on Peacekeeping held at the UN Headquarters in New 
York, on September 28, 2015, pledging one attack helicopter unit and one transport aircraft and 
signing the Declaration issues after the Summit. Elected as non-permanent member of the UN 
Security Council for 2016-17, Senegal chaired the Council’s Working Group on Peacekeeping 
Operations for a period ending on December 31, 2016. Participating in peacekeeping operations, 
not only in Africa but worldwide, is considered a key mechanism to strengthen Senegal’s role in 
sub-regional, regional and international organizations as well as to gain respect and recognition 
from major bilateral partners.  
Senegal has highly qualified women police officers who have been allowed to participate in 
peacekeeping operations since 1999. However, challenges still remain in integrating women into 
deployments. In April 2010, none of the 1,605 Senegalese troops deployed in UN peacekeeping 
operations were women. As of 31 July 2015, there were 53 females (1.46%) among the 3,613 
uniformed personnel deployed in UN peacekeeping operations. At the UN General Assembly 4th 
Committee meeting held on 30 October 2014, Senegal recognized the important role of women 
in peacekeeping operations and emphasized that their participation should be increased at all 
levels 
Current Actions 
Over the years, Senegal has developed an expertise in peacekeeping operations, which has 
become a part of its foreign policy and defense strategies. The rationales put forward by the 
President of the Republic and the Government—including the need to express solidarity with 
affected countries and the commitment to maintain international peace and security—have been 
constantly highlighted to justify the decision to deploy peacekeepers. The logistical aspects of 
army deployments are mainly supported or provided by external donors, especially the US and 
France. Senegal also has a high potential of linguistic skills among its army and police. Fluent in 
French, the official language, many officers are at least bilingual, most often in English and 
French. The outstanding military cooperation with the US helps to improve the Senegalese 
army’s abilities to serve in English-speaking environments. The operationalization of the African 
Standby Force (ASF) is a perceptible caveat that might impact Senegal’s capacity to contribute 
to UN peacekeeping operations. Indeed, Senegal is committed to provide a significant number of 
troops to the 6,500-strong ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF). Senegal has also volunteered to be 
part of the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC). Despite experience 
peacekeeping operations, Senegal has very limited specialized capabilities to be deployed. 
Senegal, like other PCCs, receives some financial profit from its participation, where 
reimbursements received from the UN have a significant economic impact on the country and on 
the peacekeepers, themselves. For instance, according to IISS Military Balance 2015 data, 
defense spending per troop in Senegal is $537 USD per month while the current UN 
reimbursement is $1,332 USD per soldier, per month. Soldiers who return from peacekeeping 
missions experience a higher standard of living than their peers, being able to keep the UN’s 
reimbursement. Most of them subsequently make economic investments or display signs of 
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wealth, such as personal investments, acquisition of homes or vehicles, and providing trips to 
Mecca for family members.  
Recommended Results and Changes 
● Leverage Senegalese pride and enthusiasm for peacekeeping deployments through 
opportunities for leadership. 
● Increase coordination of supplies and equipment utilized in PKOs. 
● Establish local capacity to manufacture equipment and supplies and to provide training to 
FPUs. 
● Solicit additional resources from foreign donors, including the US, UK, and France. 
● The advanced nature of Senegal’s equipment (specifically - attack helicopters and 
transport aircraft) requires a successful maintenance program to operate.  Senegal’s 
maintenance program should be further explored through direct discussion and 
observation to determine best-practices that can be adopted by other PCCs.  Further, 
Senegal’s proximity to other African PCCs could facilitate “train-the-trainer” programs. 
● As members of the Senegalese Armed Forces (SAF) “train extensively with the United 
States”, coordination with the US Department of Defense can identify and select SAF 
maintenance managers for specialized training during joint training events, and 
incentivize cross-training with Senegalese FPUs.
13
 
● Senegalese officers also receive training in Ghana, which presents a favorable 
combination of circumstances to explore maintenance training and dissemination 
opportunities that can impact two countries that are within the scope of this paper 
(Senegal and Ghana). 
Cameroon 
Situation 
Cameroon has been a member of the United Nations since 1960, in which the UN has 
continually held an active role in assisting Cameroon with peacekeeping and security missions. 
Even more, the UN often serves as a mediator between clashing groups and government factions 
that threaten the possibility of peace in Cameroon, pushing the nation to find peaceful solutions 
to domestic uprisings and protests.
14
  With respect to foreign policy, Cameroon is generally non-
contentious, adhering to principles of non-interference, increased assistance to underdeveloped 
countries, and commitment to peacekeeping.
15
  Similar to its relationship with the UN, US-
Cameroon diplomatic relations began in 1960 following independence of the French-
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Source:  Signe & Ostrander 2015 
administered part of country. This relationship has resulted in a partnership aimed at countering 
regional threats to stability such as the threat of Boko Haram and at addressing issues of 
democracy, regional security, environmental protection, public health, and economic 
development.
16
  While generally positive, the US’ relationship with Cameroon has been 
challenged during concerns of human rights abuses, as well as the slow pace of political and 
economic liberalization.  
Even more, the US Center for Disease Control (CDC) is active in Cameroon, engaging in 
HIV/AIDS prevention, maternal and child health, youth empowerment, and sustainable 
livelihoods. The U.S. Embassy in Cameroon organizes and funds diverse cultural, educational, 
and informational exchanges, and the Embassy administers the Special Self-Help program, the 
Democracy and Human Rights Fund program, and the Fund for Cultural Preservation. Through 
several State Department and USAID regional funds, the Embassy also provides funds for 
biodiversity protection, refugees, and civic engagement in elections processes, democratization, 
human rights, countering violent extremism, and education.
15 
Cameroon experiences internal conflict regarding policing institutions, stemming from the 
reorganization and creation of two separate police organizations: the Sûreté Nationale—tasked 
with protecting state 
institutions and 
assuring law and 
order—and the 
Gendarmerie 
Nationale—serving 
as a paramilitary 
force. The former is 
governed directly by 
the President of the 
Republic, while the 
other is controlled by 
the Ministry of 
Defense and the 
Secretary of State.
17
  
Recent cultural shifts 
in the country call for reform in which police organizations respect human rights and focus on 
providing policing functions. Currently, there are few women involved, mostly serving as police, 
representative of approximately 4% of the country’s UN peacekeepers, requiring attention to 
policies that implement gender inclusivity in PKOs.  
In 2008, Cameroon created a training program, referred to as the International School for 
Security Forces (EIFORCES), for police and law enforcement contingents for peacekeeping 
missions. The school is modeled after the Bamako peacekeeping school in Mali and the Kofi 
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Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Accra, Ghana.
18
  In 2015, Cameroon had 
approximately 1,385 UN police peacekeepers with access to 15 helicopters—8 multi-role and 7 
transport—and 25 aircraft, consisting of 5 attack and 20 transport.18 More recently, Cameroon’s 
regional police forces were given a large amount of equipment by the Governor of the Central 
Region, Joseph Otto Wilson, in 2016, including 32 vehicles, 40 motorcycles, and 153 bicycles.
19
  
The new equipment has the propensity to improve efficiency and operations of the forces.   
Current Actions 
Cameroon is currently experiencing conflicts with Boko Haram, leading to border attacks, an 
influx of refugees from neighboring states, and human rights abuses by Cameroon security 
forces.
18
 This challenge has stretched thin already-limited forces, diminished eagerness to join 
peacekeeping efforts, and decreased civilian trust, given the support for Boko Haram among 
Cameroonian peacekeepers. While Boko Haram is condemned by the Cameroonian government, 
the group continues to be extremely active in the country, developing and launching attacks 
locally in the nation. In 2015, the United States moved to assist the country in defense against 
Boko Haram in conjunction to increased training focused on combating the group; however, 
multilateral efforts, especially from Nigeria, should be engaged to address this instability.  
Recommended Results and Changes 
● Utilize Douala, the largest city in Cameroon, and its port as the main departure point for 
convoys and resupplying operations in the region. 
● Invest in new military equipment, given the age of Cameroon’s existing equipment 
Cameroon’s aging military.  
● At the time of writing, in Fiscal Year 2017, Cameroon has received over $44 million in 
funding by the USAID through 70 separate activities
20
.  We recommend that activities 
funded through the USDOS stipulate requirements relating to the establishment of 
positive maintenance culture principles. 
● Due to the increased volatility in Cameroon relating to Boko Haram, a strict adherence to 
command emphasized maintenance procedures, including supervision and oversight, 
should be implemented that focuses on preventive maintenance. 
15
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18
 Signe, L., & Ostrander, M. (2015, August). Peacekeeping Contributor Profile: Cameroon. Retrieved from 
Providing for Peacekeeping: http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/2015/08/18/peacekeeping-contributor-
profile-cameroon/ 
19
 Mosima, E. (2016). Cameroon: Police -Centre Regional Delegation Gets New Equipment. Retrieved from All 
Africa: http://allafrica.com/stories/201607040637.html 
 
20
 U.S. Agency for International Development, Foreign Aid Explorer. (2017). Cameroon query [excluding Defense 
Department]. Retrieved from 
https://explorer.usaid.gov/query?country_name=Cameroon&fiscal_year=2015&transaction_type_name=Obligations
&implementing_agency_name=U.S.%20Agency%20for%20International%20Development 
 
16 
 
Source:  Aubyn & Aning 2015 
 
Ghana 
Situation 
Personnel of the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) and Ghana Police Service (GPS) have served as 
UN peacekeepers since the early 1960s. Since their first participation in the UN Operation in the 
Congo (ONUC), over 80,000 Ghanaian military, police and civilian personnel have served in 
various capacities in more than 30 UN missions.
21
  Ghana has been a top-ten contributor for 
more than two decades, ranking eighth as of September 2015, with a total number of 3,247 
peacekeepers, comprising 353 police officers, 2,820 troops and 74 military experts (see figure 1). 
Apart from the UN, personnel of GAF and GPS also serve under AU missions at the regional 
level and at sub-regional level, missions of the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS). Currently at the regional level, Ghana’s military and police officers continue to 
serve under the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).  
In early 2014, Ghana also deployed over 800 armed troops to the UN Mission in South Sudan 
(UNMISS) in addition to the Staff Officers, Military Observers and police personnel that were 
already deployed in the mission. Though Ghana does not have personnel serving in the 
ECOWAS Mission in 
Guinea Bissau 
(ECOMIB), it 
deployed an Engineer 
Corps comprising 120 
troops to support the 
erstwhile African-led 
International Support 
Mission in Mali 
(AFISMA) by the 
ECOWAS and AU, 
which transitioned to 
MINUSMA in July 
2013. At the September 2015 Peacekeeping Summit in New York, Ghana pledged to provide a 
helicopter unit, an infantry battalion, a signals and communication company, two naval patrol 
boats, a riverine unit, a level-II hospital, and two FPUs for PKOs. Ghana’s most recent 
contribution included an Engineer Company, Military Aviation Unit, staff officers, military 
observers, police and civilian personnel to support the UN Multidimensional Integrated 
Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). As the only African Aviation Unit in MINUSMA, 
Ghana’s Aviation Unit has successfully carried out tasks such as, provision of fixed wing tactical 
air transport services for various purposes, logistics support flights, MEDEVAC/CASEVAC, and 
general passenger flights. The engineer company is also the only unit responsible for the 
construction of all prefab units in the MINUSMA Super Camp in Timbuktu.  
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Ghana’s participation has yielded operational benefits that accrue from such activities, serving as 
an avenue for the military and police to acquire overseas experience and training. The GAF has 
benefited immensely from capacity-building initiatives and training assistance programs such as 
the US African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and African Contingency Operation Training 
and Assistance (ACOTA), France’s Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capabilities 
Program (RECAMP), and Canada’s Military Training Assistance Program (MTAP). Such 
collaborative training and assistance programs have also offered opportunities for the GAF to 
accumulate military equipment and technology by retaining the supplies provided by the UN and 
other donors. Additionally, the exposure of GAF personnel, especially those in the Air Force, to 
new and difficult desert terrains like Mali enhances their professional and technical capabilities. 
While some military pilots are doubling the number of hours they have flown in aircraft since 
joining the GAF due to the vastness of Mali, the technicians are being exposed to new technical 
issues in their field of work. Through extensive pre-deployment, induction and in-mission 
training, the police have also gained broader perspectives on policing methods and issues such as 
human rights, rule of law, crowd control measures, crime scene management, investigations, and 
administration. Given the resource constraints faced by the GAF and GPS, these training 
programs have enabled them to improve skills and knowledge to reach advanced international 
military and policing standards. This has impacted positively on their professional expertise and 
capabilities and enhanced their operational performance both at home and abroad. 
Current Actions 
PKO reimbursements have provided substantial funding to the GAF and GPS, as well as 
individual personnel through the compensation packages offered by the UN—motivating 
Ghana’s continual participation. In MINUSMA, for example, the UN pays the Ghana Aviation 
Unit an amount of $9,400 USD per an hour flight. In a month, the unit is expected to do 80 hours 
flight, but it usually does about 100 hours. The UN pays $8,000 USD per hour for the extra 20 
hours. In a month, Ghana is earning about $900,000 USD from its involvement in MINUSMA. 
Even more, peacekeepers deployed receive $30 USD per day as a mission subsistence allowance. 
The UN also provides compensation for equipment costs and maintenance. For Ghana and the 
GAF especially, these financial gains represent a major supplement to the national defense 
budget, some of which has been used to purchase aircrafts and other military equipment. For 
peacekeeping personnel, the UN reimbursement package offers an important income supplement, 
allowing for a better quality of life. 
Nonetheless, internal security concerns limit Ghana’s capacity and willingness to contribute 
troops or police to certain UN missions. Currently, Ghana contributes about 20% of its total 
army to UN missions, affecting operational capacity to address internal strife during election 
periods, for example. While Ghana claims that it will limit deployments of personnel to 
peacekeeping duties during such periods, this consideration has not dramatically affected 
Ghana’s contributions. Ghana has limited modern capabilities such as strategic airlift/sealift, 
vehicles, weapons and communication equipment needed to contribute to UN peacekeeping. To 
overcome this limitation the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the GAF Council have undertaken 
initiatives to replace aging equipment with modern equipment. Even more, operationalization of 
the African Standby Force (ASF) has the propensity to affect UN contributions, where Ghana 
has already pledged an engineering company of 150 individuals, a level-II field hospital of 75 
personnel, and a helicopter squadron. To meet demands in the case of ASF or ECOWAS 
18 
 
deployment, Ghana may reduce personnel commitments to the UN. Developing the necessary 
human capacity and resourcing the GAF (with armored vehicles, troop carrying vehicles (TCVs), 
surveillance and transport aircrafts, helicopters, communications equipment, weapons and 
ammunition) will be important challenges moving forward. 
Recommended Results and Changes 
● Ongoing training, education, and certification of personnel in proper equipment 
maintenance, such as the Operations and Maintenance Training Project conducted by 
USAID and Jordan between October 2008 and November 2012. 
● Leverage foreign aid and philanthropic organizations to provide equipment management 
systems.   
● Expand Ghana’s operational capacity to deploy peacekeepers. 
● Fund the establishment of maintenance courses at Ghanaian training centers. Training 
should include techniques for tracking manufacturer recommended maintenance specific 
to equipment type, scheduling organizational maintenance activities on a weekly basis, 
and include instruction on best practices relating to monitoring stock of repair and 
replacement parts.  Activities and instruction should focus on “train-the-trainer” concepts 
so that participants have the knowledge and ability to educate FPU members and 
organizations upon return to their originating country.
22
 
Togo 
Situation 
Togo has a long-standing history in promoting and resolving international crises. Currently, 
Togolese troops are deployed in peacekeeping missions all over Africa - in Côte d'Ivoire, Sudan, 
Haiti, and Democratic Republic of the Congo. Togo has participated with the United Nations in 
multiple missions, such as the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara 
(MINURSO), United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central 
African Republic(MINUSCA), United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization 
Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti 
(MINUSTAH), African Union- United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), United 
Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS), United Nations 
Mission in Liberia(UNMIL), United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).  
 
Current Actions 
Research has yielded little information regarding Togo’s known maintenance culture, suggesting 
that Togo relies on informal maintenance cultures within its established institutions. Given that 
Togo is home to 37 separate tribes, and almost 60% of the population resides in rural areas, the 
vast dispersal of diverse groups presents challenges in centralization of information and data.
23
  
Although Togo’s organizations and institutions successfully contribute personnel and equipment 
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for UN peacekeeping operations, the wide range of tribal differences that must be integrated into 
informal maintenance cultures would prove to be a difficult task for even the most seasoned 
maintenance-support manager. Togo also lacks behind other PCCs in gender inclusivity in 
peacekeeper deployments. Given that Togo is a predominantly Muslim country, women police 
officers and peacekeepers are not permitted to carry firearms or operate vehicles—an essential 
task in PKOs. Even more, public trust for police in Togo is relatively low as compared to other 
African countries, discouraging participation in PKOs and challenging the legitimacy of FPUs.
24
 
Recommended Results and Changes 
● Establish greater transparency of police and government actions to promote public 
trust and support in these institutions. 
● Create anti-corruption task forces to mitigate fraud, waste, and abuse within policing 
institutions. 
● Promote gender equality in PKOs while also respecting religious and cultural 
traditions. 
● Due to the lack of information regarding Togo’s maintenance culture, and the 
deduced hypothesis that Togolese police rely on an informal maintenance culture, 
recommendations center around establishing basic maintenance schedules in 
accordance with manufacturer recommendations, a reward system that reinforces 
positive maintenance practices at the user level, and a focus on preventive 
maintenance. 
● Assign equipment to specific officers to create a culture of pride in individual 
maintenance practices that is reinforced with “Maintenance Awards”, such as 
additional time off, commonly sought-after duties, and recognition by the chain of 
command. 
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Appendix A: PCC Equipment
Source: Defense Web 2014
PCC Equipment Rwanda Senegal Ghana Cameroon Togo
Armor 24: T- 55/54 N/A N/A N/A 4: T-54/55, 8: Scorpion
Reconnaissance 12: VBL M11, 106: AML-60/90
52: AML-60/90, 10: M-8, 4: M-20, 
12: VXB-170 (Gendarmerie) 3: EE-9 Cascavel
31: AML-90, 6: AMX-10RC, 
15: Ferret, 8: M-8, 5: VBL
36: EE-9 Cascavel, 10: AML-
60/90, 5: M-8, 3: M-20, 2: M-
11 VBL
AIFV 35: Ratel 60/90 N/A 39: Ratel 20/90 22: LAV-150 Commando (8 with 20 mm cannon, 14 with 90 mm gun) 20: BMP-2
APC
25: RG-31 Nyala, 20: RG-32 
Scout, 12: M-3, 20: ZFB-05
12: M-3 Panhard, 10: M-3 half-tracks, 
8: Casspir, 26: Ratel-20, 12: Gila (for 
police)
50: Piranha, ? SISU XA-185, 58 WZ-
523/Type-05P, 4: Casspir, 20: Tactica
12: M-3 half track, 21: LAV-150 
Commando 30: UR-416, 4: M-3, 6: APV
Artillery N/A
6: HM-2 105 mm, 6: M116 75 mm pack, 
6: M101A1 105 mm, 6: Mod 50 155 mm, 
8: TR-F-1 155 mm
N/A N/A N/A
Self-propelled 
artillery
N/A N/A 3: Type 81 122 mm 18: ATMOS 2000 6: 122 mm
Towed artillery 29: Type-54 105 mm, 6: D-30 152 mm N/A 6: D-30 122 mm
5: M-116 75 mm, 16: M-101 105 
mm, 12: Model 1982 130 mm, 
12: Type 59 (M-46) 130 mm, 8: I1 
155 mm, 4: Soltam 155 mm
4: M101A2 105 mm
Multiple Rocket 
Launcher
5: RM-70 Dana 122 mm, 
5: Lynx N/A Type 63 107 mm 20: BM-21 122 mm N/A
Mortar 115: 81/82/120 mm 8: 81 mm, 8: 120 mm 55: 81 mm, 28: 120 mm Tampella 16: 81 mm, 16: 120 mm Brandt 20: M-43 82 mm
Anti-armor N/A 4: Milan, 31: LRAC 89 mm, STRIM-89 N/A 24: TOW (Deployed on jeeps), 25: Milan, HOT N/A
Anti-Tank Blindicide 83 mm N/A N/A N/A N/A
Recoilless rifle N/A N/A N/A 40: M-40A2 106 mm, 13: Type-52 (M-20) 75 mm
12: M-20 75 mm, 10: Type-65 
82 mm
Rocket Launcher N/A ?: RPG-7 Knout 73 mm 50: Carl Gustav 84 mm ?: LRAC 89 mm N/A
Air defense gun 150: 14.5/23/37 mm 12: L-60 40 mm, 21: M-693 20 mm 4: ZPU-2/4 14.5 mm, 4: ZU-23-2 23 mm
16: Type-58 (ZPU-2) 14.5 mm, 
1:8 Type 63 37 mm, 18: GDF-002 
35 mm, 18: Type-58 37 mm
38: ZPU-4 14.5 mm, 5: M-1939 
37 mm
Air defense missile N/A N/A ?: SA-7 Grail N/A N/A
Army
Appendix A: PCC Equipment
Source: Defense Web 2014
Structure
1st Division (HQ in Kigali, 
Central/Eastern regional 
command), 2nd Division (HQ 
in Byumba (Northern/Eastern 
regional command), 3rd 
Division (HQ Gisenyi, 
Northern/Western regional 
command), 4th Division (HQ 
in Butare, Southern/Western 
regional command)
Army Staff with 2 Divisions (Operations 
and Logistics) 
1 headquarters command, 2 territorial 
commands (Northern and Southern 
Commands), 4 infantry brigades, 1 
reconnaissance regiment (3 
reconnaissance squadron), 2 
airborne/special forces companies, 1 
artillery regiment (1 artillery battery, 
2 mortar batteries), 1 field engineer 
regiment, 1 training battalion, 1 signal 
regiment, 1 transport battalion, 1 
support services brigade
4 infantry battalions, 1 Rapid 
Intervention battalion with five 
detachments and a Delta region 
detachment (total 6 900 personnel), 
1 armoured car battalion, 1 artillery 
battalion, 1 anti-aircraft battalion, 1 
commando battalion, Engineer and 
supporting units, Presidential Guard
Rapid Intervention Force 
(battalion strength), 4 combined 
arms regiments, 1 Presidential 
Guard regiment (Commando), 1 
para-commando regiment, 1 
support regiment, 1 armored 
group
Maritime/EW/RECC
E aircraft
N/A
1: C212 (SAR), 2: King Air 200 (Used for 
weather reconnaissance), 4: Rallye 235 
Guerrier 1: C212 (SAR), 1: Embraer 
EMB-111, 1: PA-23 (liaison), 1: BN-2 
Islander (for maritime patrol)
5: Diamond DA 42 N/A N/A
Trainer/light combat 
aircraft
N/A 2: TB-30 Epsilon, 3: Super Tucano (on order)
4: K-8 Karakorum (combat capable), 
2: L-39 (reported unserviceable), 
2: MB-339 (reported unserviceable)
4: Alpha Jet, 5: CM-170 Majister ?
5: Alpha Jet, 4: EMB-326 
Xavante, 3: TB-30 Epsilon, 4: 
CM-170 Magister
Transport aircraft 3: An-8 Camp (reported), 1: BN-2A Islander (reported)
1: CN235, 1: F27 Friendship, 1: Boeing 
727-200 (VIP), 1: C212
1: BN-2 Defender, 3: Cessna 172, 
4: F27 Friendship, 2: C295, 1: C212
1: CN235, 2: C-130H Hercules, 1: C-
130H-30, 1: DHC-4 Caribou, 2: PA-
23 Aztec, 1: B-707 (Passenger), 
1: Gulfstream 3 (Passenger), 2: Do-
128-2, 2: Do-28, 2: IAI Arava, 
1: MA60
2: King Air 200, 1: F28, 1: 
Boeing 707-320B, 2: DHC-5D, 
2: B58 Baron, 2: Cessna 337, 1: 
Do-27A4
Combat aircraft N/A N/A 3: MB-326K (unserviceable) 5: Impala Mk 1/2 (MB-326K) (Said to be non operational) N/A
VIP aircraft
1: B707 (reported), 
1: Gulfstream G550, 
1: Bombardier Global Express
N/A 1: F28 Fellowship, 1: Falcon 900 N/A N/A
Combat helicopter 5: Mi-24 Hind 2: Mi-35P Hind N/A 3: Mi-24 Hind N/A
Transport helicopter 9: Mi-17 Hip, 4: SA 342 A
1: AS-355 Twin Squirrel
2: Mi-2 Hoplite, 2: Mi-171 Hip, 1: SA 
341 Gazelle, 2: SA 330 Puma, 1: UH-1H
4: Mi-17, 6: Mi-17Shs (on order), 
2: AW-109A, 1: Bell 212, 2: SA 319 
Alouette 3
1: AS-365 Dauphin, 2: Bell 412, 
2: SA-313B Alouette 2, 1: SA-313 
Alouette 2, 2: SA-319 Alouette 3, 
4: SA-342 Gazelle (Equipped with 
HOT Anti tank missiles), 1: AS-332 
Super Puma, 3: Bell 206 Jet Ranger, 
2: Bell 206L-3 Long Ranger
1: SA 316, 1: SA 315, 1: SA 
330 Puma, 1: AS 332 Super 
Puma
Air Force
Appendix A: PCC Equipment
Source: Defense Web 2014
Structure N/A
Air Staff with 2 Divisions (Operations 
and Logistics), Support Group, Air 
Operations Group, Air School
N/A N/A N/A
Patrol/Strike boat 
(Gun/Missile/OPV/I
PV)
N/A
1: Fouta class large patrol boat (Osprey-
55 type), 2: Saint Louis class, 
1: Njambour class large patrol boat 
(PR72MS type), 2: Alioune Samb class 
(ex-US Swift class), 2: Alphonse Baye 
(RPB 20SE, Fishery Protection 
Directorate), 1: Senegal 2, 2: Popenguine 
large inshore patrol boats (P48 type), 
3: Senegal class patrol craft, 2: Peterson-
type patrol boats, 4: police launches, 
2: Challenge class (Tracker-type coastal 
patrol craft), 1: Conejera patrol craft (ex-
Spanish), 1: Raidco RPB 33
2: Albatros class fast attack craft 
(Lurssen 45 m FPB45 type), 
2: Gepard class, 4: Snake class 
(Chinese), 2: Balsam class (Ex US 
Coast Guard), 1: Chamsuri class, 
2: Achimota (GER Lurssen 57m FPB 
57 type), 2: Warrior class/Gepard 
class fast attack craft (ex-German), 
1: Stephen Otu (ex-South Korean 
Chamsuri [Dolphin] class), 2: Anzone 
class transports (ex-USCG Balsam 
class seagoing buoy tenders)
2: FRA P-48 (Gun), 6: Rodman 
101/46 (Gun), 1: Quartier class 
(Gun), 3: Boston Whalter patrol 
boats, 1: Bakassi class patrol boat 
(P48S type), 1: L’Audacieux class 
missile FAC (P48 type), 1: Alfred 
Motto class patrol craft, 
20: Swiftship type river boats, 
2: Yunnan class landing craft, 
8: Simoneau, 2: Aresa 2400 CPV 
Defender patrol boats, 1: Aresa 
2300 landing craft, 6: Aresa 750 
Commandos RIBs, 5: 1200 Stealth 
RIBs, 1: 1200 Defcon RIB
2: Kara class (IPV), 2: RPB 33 
(for delivery in March/July 
2014)
Amphibious/Transpo
rt/Supply
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Structure N/A
Navy Staff and 3 Crops (Naval 
Operations Group, Naval Support Group, 
Riverine Surveillance Group)
N/A There are major naval bases in douala, Kribi and Limbe. N/A
Harbor/River patrol N/A N/A 6: Defender class (US donated) N/A N/A
Navy
